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Abstract
In the paper, using the language of spin-half particles, Hardy’s paradox is examined within
different semantics: a partial one, a many-valued one, and one defined as a set of weak values
of projection operators. As it is shown in this paper, any of such non-classical semantics can
resolve Hardy’s paradox.
Keywords: Quantum mechanics; Hardy’s paradox; Truth values; Partial semantics; Many-
valued semantics; Weak values of projection operators.
1 Introduction
In essence, Hardy’s paradox can be reduced to a case of contradiction in classical logic.
Indeed, let the letters A and B denote respectively a positron and an electron entering their corre-
sponding superimposed Mach-Zehnder interferometers depicted in Figure 1 (drawn in conformity
with [1, 2, 3]). These interferometers have non-overlapping arms (denoted as NA and NB) in addi-
tion to the overlapping arms (which are denoted as OA and OB). Besides, each interferometer is
equipped with two detectors (represented by the symbols DA1 , D
A
2 as well as D
B
1 , D
B
2 ) capable of
detecting the exit of the particle from the interferometer.
Consider at first each interferometer separately. By way of the adjustment of the arm lengths
between the beam-splitters (BSA1 and BS
A
2 or BS
B
1 and BS
B
2 ) it is possible to make the particle A
emerge only at DA2 or the particle B only at D
B
2 . Then again, the detector D
A
1 or D
B
1 can be also
triggered if an obstruction is present in the arm OA or OB.
According to the design of Hardy’s thought experiment, if each interferometer is considered sep-
arately, the particle A can be detected only at DA
2
and the particle B only at DB
2
. However, due
to the presence of the overlapping arms in the setup of the experiment (and, for that reason, the
possibility of the obstruction), the detectors DA1 and D
B
1 may be triggered.
Thus, from the clicking of DB1 one can infer that the particle A has gone through the overlapping
arm OA obstructing the particle B (and because of this the particle B was not able to get to DB2 ).
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Figure 1: Diagram representing the design of Hardy’s thought experiment.
Similarly, the click of DA
1
would mean that the particle B went through the overlapping arm OB
obstructing the particle A (which, as a result, could not reach DA
2
).
Obviously, if both the particle A and the particle B went through the overlapping arms OA and
OB, they would annihilate. So, classically speaking, the simultaneous clicking of the detectors DA1
and DB1 is impossible.
Let v be a valuation, that is, a mapping from a set of propositions {⋄} (where the symbol ⋄ stands
for any proposition, compound or simple) to a set of truth-values VN = {v} having the cardinality
N and the range with the upper bound 1 (representing the truth) and the lower bound 0 (repre-
senting the falsehood). As it is customary [4], the double-bracket notation [[ ⋄ ]]v is used to denote
the valuation v.
Based on the setup of the interferometers, one can derive the next equalities:
[[ DB1 ]]v = [[O
A ]]v , (1)
[[ DA1 ]]v = [[O
B ]]v . (2)
They mean, for example, that the proposition asserting the passage of the particle A through the
overlapping arm OA has the same value as the proposition asserting the click of the detector DB
1
;
2
in other words, these propositions are both true or both false.
From these equalities it immediately follows
[[D1 ]]v = [[O ]]v , (3)
where the symbol D1 stands for the proposition of the simultaneous clicking of the detectors D
B
1
and DA1 , while the symbol O denotes the proposition that both particles travelled through the
overlapping arms OB and OA in their respective interferometers.
On the other hand, the situation where both particles were in the overlapping arms OB and OA
cannot occur because of the annihilation process. Accordingly, in the initial state of the experi-
ment, i.e., before the verification of the proposition D1, the proposition O is false, namely, [[ O ]]v = 0.
Let P [[[ ⋄ ]]v = 1] ∈ [0, 1] be the value that represents the probability that the proposition ⋄ is true.
Assume that the following conditions are satisfied:
[[ ⋄ ]]v = 1 ⇐⇒ P [[[ ⋄ ]]v = 1] = 1 , (4)
[[ ⋄ ]]v = 0 ⇐⇒ P [[[ ⋄ ]]v = 1] = 0 . (5)
Then, in terms of a probabilistic logic [5, 6], the equality (3) would imply that the probability of
the simultaneous clicking of the detectors DB1 and D
A
1 must be zero:
[[ O ]]v = 0 =⇒ P [[[ D1 ]]v = 1] = 0 . (6)
However, in accordance with quantum mechanics, the probability P [[[ D1 ]]v = 1] is different from
zero, that is, sometimes the particles do emerge simultaneously at DB1 and D
A
1 . This constitutes
Hardy’s paradox, namely,
[[ O ]]v = 0
[[D1 ]]v = [[O ]]v
}
=⇒ P [[[ D1 ]]v = 1] 6= 0 . (7)
As one can see, the paradox arises because of the implicit assumption supposing that any propo-
sition relating to a quantum system is either true or false. Mathematically, it is equivalent to the
statement that a logic lying behind quantum phenomena has a non-partial bivalent semantics that
is defined as a set of bivaluations [[ ⋄ ]]v ∈ V2 = {0, 1}.
This suggests that the said paradox might not appear within semantics that are partial or many-
valued (or both).
Really, consider a “gappy” semantics where the valuation v is the function from propositions {⋄}
into the set V2 = {0, 1} such that v is not total. In this case, even if the proposition O is false,
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some propositions, e.g., D1, might have no truth-values at all, which can explain the deviation of
the probability P [[[ D1 ]]v = 1] from zero.
Let us demonstrate a resolution of the paradox (7) based on the aforesaid gappy semantics as well
as gapless many-valued semantics.
2 Truth-value assignment of the projection operators
Let Pˆ⋄ be the projection operator on the Hilbert space H associated with some quantum system
such that Pˆ⋄ corresponds to the proposition ⋄ related to this system. Assume that the valuational
axiom hold
v(Pˆ⋄) = [[ ⋄ ]]v , (8)
where v is the truth-value assignment function.
To find out how this function works, let us take a quantum system prepared in a pure state |Ψα〉
lying in the column space (range) of the projection operator Pˆα. Since being in ran(Pˆα) means
Pˆα|Ψα〉 = 1 · |Ψα〉, one can assume that in the state |Ψα〉 ∈ ran(Pˆα), the truth-value assignment
function v assigns the truth value 1 to the projection operator Pˆα and, in this way, the proposition
α, specifically, v(Pˆα) = [[α ]]v = 1. Contrariwise, if v(Pˆα) = [[α ]]v = 1, then one can assume that the
system is prepared in the state |Ψα〉 ∈ ran(Pˆα). These two assumptions can be recorded together
as the following logical biconditional:
|Ψα〉 ∈ ran(Pˆα) ⇐⇒ v(Pˆα) = [[α ]]v = 1 . (9)
On the other hand, the vector |Ψα〉 is in the null space of any projection operator Pˆβ orthogonal
to Pˆα. Since being in ker(Pˆβ) means Pˆβ|Ψα〉 = 0 · |Ψα〉, one can assume then
|Ψα〉 ∈ ker(Pˆβ) = ran(1ˆ− Pˆβ) ⇐⇒ v(Pˆβ) = [[β ]]v = 0 . (10)
Bringing the last two assumptions into a union, one can write down the following bivaluations
|Ψ〉 ∈
{
ran(Pˆ⋄)
ran(¬Pˆ⋄)
⇐⇒ v(Pˆ⋄) = [[ ⋄ ]]v ∈ V2 , (11)
where the operation ¬Pˆ⋄ = 1ˆ− Pˆ⋄ is understood as negation of Pˆ⋄.
Suppose by contrast that the system is prepared in the state |Ψ〉 that does not lie in the column or
null space of the projection operator Pˆ⋄, i.e., |Ψ〉 /∈ ran(Pˆ⋄) and at the same time |Ψ〉 /∈ ran(¬Pˆ⋄).
Then, under the bivaluations (11), the truth-value function v must assign neither 1 nor 0 to Pˆ⋄,
that is, v(Pˆ⋄) 6= 1 and v(Pˆ⋄) 6= 0. This means that the proposition ⋄ associated with Pˆ⋄ cannot be
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bivalent under the function v, namely, [[ ⋄ ]]v /∈ V2.
Using a gappy yet two-valued semantics, the failure of bivalence can be described as the truth-value
gaps, explicitly,
|Ψ〉 /∈
{
ran(Pˆ⋄)
ran(¬Pˆ⋄)
⇐⇒ {v(Pˆ⋄)} = {[[ ⋄ ]]v} = ∅ . (12)
Observe that under the bivaluations (11), the projection operators 1ˆ and 0ˆ are true and false,
respectively, in any arbitrary state |Ψ〉 ∈ H, namely,
|Ψ〉 ∈
{
ran(1ˆ) = H
ran(¬0ˆ) = H ⇐⇒
{
v(1ˆ) = 1
v(0ˆ) = 0
. (13)
Therefore, under those bivaluations, the operator 1ˆ can be equated with “the super-truth” since it
can be assigned the value of the truth in all admissible states of the quantum system. Similarly,
the operator 0ˆ can be equated with “the super-falsity” because it can be assigned the value of the
falsity in all admissible states of the quantum system. Accordingly, one can call gappy semantics
defined as the set of the bivaluations (11) and the truth-value gaps (12) quantum supervaluationism
(for other details of such semantics see, for example, [7, 8] and also [9, 10]).
3 Hardy’s paradox described in the language of spin-half particles
In the language of spin-half particles, particle A’s states |OA〉 and |NA〉 in the overlapping and
non-overlapping arms of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer can be represented by the normalized
eigenvectors of Pauli matrices corresponding to the eigenvalues +1 and −1, namely,
|OA〉 def=
[
1
0
]
, |NA〉 def=
[
0
1
]
. (14)
Obviously, kets |OB〉 and |NB〉 can be represented in the same way.
Using such a representation, the projection operators corresponding to the propositions OA and
NA are defined by
PˆOA = |OA〉〈OA| =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, (15)
PˆNA = |NA〉〈NA| =
[
0 0
0 1
]
. (16)
Consequently, the projection operator PˆO relating to the proposition O can be expressed as
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PˆO = PˆOA ⊗ PˆOB = |OA〉〈OA| ⊗ |OB〉〈OB| =
[
1 0
0 0
]
⊗
[
1 0
0 0
]
=


1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 . (17)
The column and null spaces of this operator are
ran(PˆO) =




a
0
0
0

 : a ∈ R


, (18)
ran(¬PˆO) =




0
b
c
d

 : b, c, d ∈ R


. (19)
According to the bivaluations (11), for the proposition O to have the value of the falsity in the
state |Ψ¬O〉, the last-named must lie in the null space of the projection operator PˆO:
|Ψ¬O〉 ∈ ran(¬PˆO) ⇐⇒ v(PˆO) = [[O ]]v = 0 . (20)
Provided b = c = d, this state |Ψ¬O〉 can be written down as
|Ψ¬O〉 = 1√
3


0
1
1
1

= 1√3
(
|OA〉 ⊗ |NB〉+ |NA〉 ⊗ |OB〉+ |NA〉 ⊗ |NB〉
)
(21)
and taken as the initial state of the system (i.e., the state prior to the verification).
The detectors in particle A’s interferometer verify the values of the operators Pˆ
DA
2
and Pˆ
DA
1
, whose
projections on the states |OA〉 and |NA〉 can be defined by the following superpositions
|DA2 〉 =
1√
2
(
|OA〉+ |NA〉
)
=
1√
2
([
1
0
]
+
[
0
1
])
=
1√
2
([
1
1
])
, (22)
|DA1 〉 =
1√
2
(
|OA〉 − |NA〉
)
=
1√
2
([
1
0
]
−
[
0
1
])
=
1√
2
([
1
−1
])
. (23)
These superpositions (and equivalent ones for particle B’s states |OB〉 and |NB〉) allow one to
identify the projection operators Pˆ
DA
2
and Pˆ
DA
1
(along with Pˆ
DB
2
and Pˆ
DB
1
)
Pˆ
DA
2
= |DA2 〉〈DA2 | =
1
2
[
1 1
1 1
]
, (24)
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Pˆ
DA
1
= |DA1 〉〈DA1 | =
1
2
[
1−1
−1 1
]
, (25)
and, then, the projection operators PˆD2 and PˆD1
PˆD2 = PˆDA
2
⊗ Pˆ
DB
2
=
1
4


1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1

 , (26)
PˆD1 = PˆDA
1
⊗ Pˆ
DB
1
=
1
4


1−1−1 1
−1 1 1−1
−1 1 1−1
1−1−1 1

 , (27)
whose column and null spaces are
ran(PˆD2) =




a
a
a
a

 : a ∈ R


, ran(¬PˆD2) =




−b− c− d
b
c
d

 : b, c, d ∈ R


, (28)
ran(PˆD1) =




a
−a
−a
a

 : a ∈ R


, ran(¬PˆD1) =




b+ c− d
b
c
d

 : b, c, d ∈ R


. (29)
As follows, the null space of the projection operator PˆO cannot be a subset or superset of the
column space or the null space of the projection operator PˆD1 , namely,




0
b
c
d

 : b, c, d ∈ R


6⊂
6⊃






a
−a
−a
a

 : a ∈ R





b+ c− d
b
c
d

 : b, c, d ∈ R


. (30)
Under the truth-value gaps (12), this necessitates absolutely no truth value for the proposition D1
in the initial state |Ψ¬O〉:
|Ψ¬O〉 = 1√
3


0
1
1
1

 /∈
{
ran(PˆD1)
ran(¬PˆD1)
⇐⇒ {v(PˆD1)} = {[[ D1 ]]v} = ∅ . (31)
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This in turn implies that, in accordance with the probability postulation (5), the a priori probability
of the simultaneous clicking of the detectors DB
1
and DA
1
must not be equal to zero:
|Ψ¬O〉 ∈ ran(¬PˆO) ⇐⇒ [[ O ]]v = 0{[[ D1 ]]v} = ∅
}
=⇒ P [[[ D1 ]]v = 1] 6= 0 . (32)
Contrariwise, when the detectors DB1 and D
A
1 click simultaneously and thus the system is found in
the state |ΨD1〉, namely,
|ΨD1〉 = |DA1 〉 ⊗ |DB1 〉 =
1
2


1
−1
−1
1

∈ ran(PˆD1) =⇒ v(PˆD1) = [[D1 ]]v = 1 , (33)
the proposition asserting that both particles have passed the overlapping arms in their respective
interferometers would possess no value at all:
|ΨD1〉 /∈
{
ran(PˆO)
ran(¬PˆO)
⇐⇒ {v(PˆO)} = {[[ O ]]v} = ∅ . (34)
Accordingly, in supervaluationist (i.e., gappy and yet bivalent) semantics, the question “Which way
did the particle take?” has no sense.
4 Resolving Hardy’s paradox within gapless semantics
As it is mentioned in [11], for gappy semantics, one can construct a gapless (non-classical) semantics
in which different degrees of truth would fill out the truth-value gaps.
4.1 Many-valued semantics
To that end, instead of the truth-value gaps (12) consider the gapless valuations, namely,
|Ψ〉 /∈
{
ran(Pˆ⋄)
ran(¬Pˆ⋄) ⇐⇒ vP(Pˆ⋄) = 〈Ψ|Pˆ⋄|Ψ〉 , (35)
where the function vP assigning the truth value to the projection operator Pˆ⋄ in the state |Ψ〉 is deter-
mined by the probability P [[[ ⋄]]v = 1] = 〈Ψ|Pˆ⋄|Ψ〉. According to [12, 13], the value vP represents the
degree to which the proposition ⋄ is true before its verification. As 〈Ψ|Pˆ⋄|Ψ〉 ∈ {x ∈ R : 0 < x < 1},
a semantics defined by the set of the bivaluations (11) and the valuations (35) is infinite-valued.
Therewithal, this semantics respects functionality of the evaluation relation; what is more, in this
semantics the evaluation relation is a total relation.
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Within the said semantics, the truth value of the proposition D1 in the initial state |Ψ¬O〉 and the
truth value of the proposition O in the final state |ΨD1〉 are given by
|Ψ¬O〉 = 1√
3


0
1
1
1

 /∈
{
ran(PˆD1)
ran(¬PˆD1)
=⇒ vP(PˆD1) = 〈Ψ¬O|PˆD1 |Ψ¬O〉 =
1
12
, (36)
|ΨD1〉 =
1
2


1
−1
−1
1

 /∈
{
ran(PˆO)
ran(¬PˆO) =⇒ vP(PˆO) = 〈ΨD1 |PˆO|ΨD1〉 =
1
4
. (37)
Both of these truth values differ from the classical truth values “false” and “true”, i.e., 0 and 1.
Therefore, in the infinite-valued (i.e., gapless but non-bivalent) semantics the proposition of the
simultaneous clicking of the detectors DB
1
and DA
1
in the initial state |Ψ¬O〉 is neither true nor false.
Along the same lines, the proposition affirming that the particles have taken the overlapping ways
OB and OA is neither true nor false in the final state |ΨD1〉.
4.2 Weak-valued semantics
Another possibility to construct a gapless semantics presents weak values of the projection opera-
tors. To be sure, consider the “weak” valuations
|Ψ〉 /∈
{
ran(Pˆ⋄)
ran(¬Pˆ⋄) ⇐⇒ vw(Pˆ⋄) =
〈Φ|Pˆ⋄|Ψ〉
〈Φ|Ψ〉 , (38)
where the bra 〈Φ| is some vector of the dual space H∗ associated with the given quantum system.
Had the quantum system been prepared in the state |Ψ〉 lying in the column or null space of the
projection operator Pˆ⋄, such valuations would have coincided with the bivaluations (11). What is
more, had the bra 〈Φ| been the Hermitian conjugate of the ket |Ψ〉, i.e., 〈Φ| = 〈Ψ|, the value vw(Pˆ⋄)
would have lain in the range {x ∈ R : 0 < x < 1}.
Given that neither of these statements is fulfilled, one can deduce that a semantics defined as the
set of the bivaluations (11) and the weak valuations (38) is not bivalent and, unlike many-valued
semantics, may include “truth degrees” lying beyond the range [0, 1]. This last detail makes any
conventional interpretation of truth degrees inapplicable to the weak truth values.
Even so, an interpretation of the weak truth degrees, uncontroversial in a sense, can be based on the
observation made in [14] and the comments in [15]: According to them, non-zeroness (respectively,
zeroness) of the value vw(Pˆ⋄) can be interpreted as the divergence (conformity) of the proposition
⋄ from (to) the false, i.e., a trivial proposition whose truth value being always false.
9
Take, for example, the proposition D1 in the initial state |Ψ¬O〉 and the proposition O in the final
state |ΨD1〉: Under the weak valuations (38), they can be evaluated as
|Ψ¬O〉 /∈
{
ran(PˆD1)
ran(¬PˆD1)
=⇒ vw(PˆD1) =
〈ΨD1 |PˆD1 |Ψ¬O〉
〈ΨD1 |Ψ¬O〉
= 1 , (39)
|ΨD1〉 /∈
{
ran(PˆO)
ran(¬PˆO)
=⇒ vw(PˆO) = 〈Ψ¬O|PˆO|ΨD1〉〈Ψ¬O|ΨD1〉
= 0 . (40)
In line with the said interpretation, these weak truth degrees mean that despite the falsity of the
proposition O in the initial state |Ψ¬O〉, the proposition of the simultaneous clicking D1 cannot
be regarded as false in this state. By the same token, the fact that in the final state |ΨD1〉 the
proposition D1 diverges from the false does not imply that in the same state the proposition O
differs from the false as well.
That is to say, in the weak-valued (i.e., gapless and non-bivalent) semantics, it holds that
[[O ]]v = 0 ; [[ D1 ]]vw = 0 , (41)
[[ D1 ]]v 6= 0 ; [[ O ]]vw 6= 0 . (42)
As it follows, any of the mentioned in this paper non-classical semantics resolve Hardy’s paradox.
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